a. Field of the Invention
This invention relates to fault detection in electrical circuits, in particular it relates to fault detection for a plurality of adjacent input circuits.
In safety control systems, fault tolerance is of utmost importance. Fault tolerance is the ability to continue functioning in the event of one or more failures within the system.
Fault tolerance may be achieved by a number of different techniques, each with its specific advantages and disadvantages. One example of fault tolerance is known as Hardware Implemented Fault Tolerance (HIFT). HIFT means that the system relies on robust hardware circuits (as opposed to complex software algorithms) to perform the fault detection and redundancy management functions. A significant advantage HIFT has over software-implemented fault tolerance is that HIFT eliminates the overhead for communications between processors, leaving more time for controlling the process. This makes HIFT systems significantly faster and more dependable than systems using software-implemented fault tolerance.
An example of a HIFT system is a system which provides redundancy, in particular Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). Using TMR, critical circuits are triplicated and perform identical functions simultaneously and independently. The data output from each of the three circuits is voted in a majority-voting circuit, before affecting the system's outputs. If one of the triplicated circuits fails, its data output is ignored. However, the system continues to output to the process the value (voltage, current level, or discrete output state) that agrees with the majority of the functional circuits. TMR provides continuous, predictable operation.
HIFT and TMR provides for automatic fault recovery with no disruption to system operation and ensures minimal fault detection periods.
Another approach to fault tolerance is the use of hot-standby modules. This approach provides a level of fault tolerance whereby the standby module maintains system operation in the event of module failure. With this approach there may be some disruption to system operation during the changeover period if the modules are not themselves fault-tolerant.
Fault tolerant systems ideally create a Fault Containment Region (FCR) to ensure that a fault within the FCR boundary does not propagate to the remainder of the system. This enables multiple faults to co-exist on different parts of a system without affecting operation.
Fault tolerant systems generally employ dedicated hardware and software test and diagnostic regimes that provide very fast fault recognition and response times to provide a safer system.
Commonly, it is possible to repair faults without interrupting system operation (known as hot replacement). For example active and standby module may operate in parallel so that if an active module becomes faulty there is an automatic change over to a standby module.
Safety control systems are generally designed to be ‘fail-operational/fail-safe’. Fail operational means that when a failure occurs, the system continues to operate: it is in a fail-operational state. The system should continue to operate in this state until the failed module is replaced and the system is returned to a fully operational state.
An example of fail safe operation occurs, for example if, in a TMR system, a failed module is not replaced before a second failure in a parallel circuit occurs, the second failure should cause the TMR system to shut down to a fail-safe state.
Typical safety control applications include emergency and safety shutdown systems, process control, reactor control, wellhead control, turbine and compressor control, fire and gas detection and abatement, and are applicable to many industries including oil and gas production and refining, chemical production and processing, power generation, paper and textile mills and sewage treatment plants.